Introduction and Background
The Social Security program under current law is not financially solvent due to the impending retirement of the baby boom cohort and other demographic and economic factors. In other words, at some point in the future, benefit obligations will exceed tax receipts and the trust fund balance will be exhausted. The latest estimates from the Social Security Board of Trustees indicate that benefits will exceed revenues in 2018, and the trust fund balance will be depleted in 2042 (Board of Trustees 2003) . As this pending problem has been apparent for many years, analysts and legislators have put forth numerous proposals to return the Social Security program to long-term solvency. Most of those proposals, however, ignore the interactions between Social Security reform and the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). SSI is a means-tested program administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) that essentially provides an income floor for elderly individuals and couples with low incomes and limited assets. 1 The reforms developed by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, for example, do not consider interactions with the SSI program. Rather, the Commission's report suggests that the SSI program should be re-examined for consistency with a reformed Social Security system (President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security 2001). Indeed, only recently have researchers begun to estimate the effects of Social Security reform on the SSI program, or consider the income support features of SSI as an integral part of Social Security reform (Favreault, Berk, and Smith 2003; Koenig et al 2003; Rupp, Strand, and Davies 2003) . This paper explicitly considers interactions between potential Social Security reforms and the elderly component of the SSI program. Using a microsimulation model -the Social Security Administration's Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) -we simulate six reform options that consist of changes to the Social Security system and/or changes to the SSI program. The common element of each reform package might be thought of as a "worst-case" scenario -a reduction in Social Security benefits by the percentage necessary to approach 75-year solvency. To this benefit reduction, we then add options for creating a minimum Social Security benefit, increasing the SSI federal benefit rate, increasing the SSI general income exclusion, and increasing the SSI asset threshold. We compare the effects of the simulated reforms on the elderly population in 2022 to current law estimates for the elderly in 2022, specifically focusing on changes in benefit receipt patterns (Social Security only, SSI only, concurrent Social Security and SSI, neither), poverty status for each group of program participants, and winners and losers from each reform option. In addition, appendix tables present detailed dis tributional estimates for each reform package by gender, marital status, age, and lifetime earnings quintile.
Our estimates suggest that elderly Social Security beneficiaries will indeed turn to the SSI program to help replace lost income from Social Security benefit cuts, but only in relatively small fractions. However, if the Social Security benefit cuts are combined with SSI reforms, the SSI program will play a more important income security role for those elderly Social Security beneficiaries at the lower end of the income distribution. Having said that, the implementation of a minimum benefit as part of the Social Security program does more to provide income security and alleviate poverty among the elderly, and can be designed in a cost-neutral fashion. In order for the SSI program to play a more effective income security role for the elderly in the 1 The SSI program also provides benefits to disabled adults and children with low incomes and assets. However, this paper only focuses on the portion of the SSI program that pays benefits to the elderly (aged 65 and over).
face of Social Security benefit reductions, substantial SSI reforms are needed. Although such reforms would drastically increase the cost of the SSI program, the resulting increase in combined Social Security and SSI expenditures on the elderly would be fairly modest.
Clearly, many other Social Security and SSI reform options are under consideration. For example, many proposals call for the creation of personal retirement accounts and/or price indexing of initial Social Security benefits (rather than wage indexing) (President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security 2001). One can envision several different versions of a Social Security minimum benefit. Different SSI reforms also are available, for example benefit reforms tied to living arrangements (Koenig et al 2003) . Such reforms are substantially more complex than the options simulated in this paper. They may generate behavioral responses and/or interactions between the Social Security and SSI programs that are different than those simulated here, and thus may lead to different conclusions about the distributional implications of Social Security reform. Our conclusions about the relative effects of Social Security and SSI reforms on the elderly are thus limited to the set of reform options explicitly simulated in this paper.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some background on the SSI program, its importance in reducing poverty among the elderly, and how it interacts with the Social Security program. We then describe the six reform options that are the focus of our simulations, followed by a discussion of the simulation methodology and presentation of the results of the simulations. The final section offers some concluding thoughts.
SSI Program
The SSI program provides an income floor for elderly and disabled persons. It first started paying benefits in January 1974. Individuals with low incomes and limited assets who are age 65 or over or who meet SSA's strict disability criteria can receive a basic monthly benefit from the program. In 2003, the federal benefit rate (FBR) for SSI was $552 for individuals and $829 for couples. That amounts to about 74 percent of the federal poverty guideline for an aged individual and 82 percent of the federal poverty guideline for an aged couple. The FBR is indexed for inflation, increasing each year based on the cost-of-living adjustment to Social Security benefits. The monthly federal SSI benefit for which an individual or couple is eligible is equal to the relevant FBR less countable income. Forty-five states supplement the federal benefit, with wide variation in supplement amounts and eligibility rules.
In December 2002, approximately 2 million elderly individuals received SSI benefits, along with 3.9 million individuals aged 18 to 64 and 0.9 million children under age 18. Although the overall SSI caseload has grown substantially -from 4 million recipients in 1974 to 6.8 million recipients in 2002 -elderly recipients have decreased both in absolute number and as a proportion of the total caseload. In 2002, the elderly accounted for just 29 percent of the total SSI caseload, compared to nearly 61 percent in 1974 (Social Security Administration, 2003b, Table 3 ).
A variety of exclusions are applied when determining countable income for federal SSI benefits. The first $20 of income of any kind is excluded from countable income (this is known as the program's general income exclusion). For elderly individuals and couples, this often amounts to excluding the first $20 of monthly Social Security income. After that, Social Security benefits (and other unearned income) reduce SSI benefits on a dollar-for-dollar basis. As a work incentive, the first $65 of monthly earnings and one-half of monthly earnings in excess of $65 is excluded from countable income. The level of these exclusions has not changed since the inception of the SSI program in 1974, and inflation has eroded their value substantially.
The SSI resource test requires that eligible individuals have no more than $2,000 of countable resources. The corresponding threshold for couples is $3,000. The value of the individual's or couple's primary residence is not counted against the asset test, nor is the value of one vehicle, as long as it is used to get to work or medical appointments. Resource exclusions also are available for up to $1,500 set aside for burial expenses, and for the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy up to $1,500. The resource thresholds have not been increased since 1989, thus their real value has decreased substantially over time.
Despite this erosion in the value of eligibility and exclusion parameters because of inflation, SSI remains an important source of income for elderly recipients. The average monthly federally administered payment to elderly SSI recipients was $332 in December 2002 (Social Security Administration, 2003b, (Davies, 2002; Davies et al, 2002; McGarry, 1996 McGarry, , 2002 .
Reform Options
We consider six potential reform options, which we describe below and in Table 1 . The common feature of all six reform options is the Social Security (OASDI) benefit cut of option 1. Options 2 through 6 include additional features that offset the benefit cut to varying degrees for certain groups. Carrying the benefit cut of option 1 through the other five reform options supports the most consistent comparisons of the various offset features.
Option 1: Cut OASDI benefits by the percentage necessary to achieve 75-year solvency. According to the Board of Trustees (2003) , an immediate benefit cut of 13 percent would return the OASDI trust fund to 75-year solvency. Although this is a rather draconian approach to solving the solvency problem, it is well suited for addressing this paper's research objectives. First, it is a straightforward reform option that we can easily model in MINT. Second, large OASDI benefit reductions provide perhaps the most direct avenue for spillover effects on the SSI program. As OASDI benefits decline, some beneficiaries will become eligible for SSI benefits, while those who receive SSI under current law will see a dollar-for-dollar increase in their SSI benefit, up to the FBR.
We apply the OASDI benefit cut to all individuals who first reach age 60, become disabled, or die in 2004. All others are grandfathered under current law. We phase the cut in gradually, with a one benefit percent reduction for those in the first cohort (1944) and an additional percentage point for each subsequent cohort, until reaching the ultimate reduction of 13 percent for all persons born in 1956 or later. Spouses and survivors face the rules of their own cohort, not of the working spouse's cohort. This reform option influences SSI take-up among the elderly via changes to the expected SSI federal benefit.
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Option 2: OASDI benefit cut plus minimum benefit financed by general revenues. Recognizing the rather drastic nature of reform option 1, option 2 attempts to offset the OASDI benefit cuts to some degree for those at the lower end of the benefit distribution. The minimum benefit provision is tied to both the poverty threshold and an individual's work history. The basic minimum benefit is set at 50 percent of poverty for workers with at least 15 years of covered work, where a year of covered work is defined as four covered quarters. The minimum benefit increases by two percentage points for each additional year of covered work, reaching a maximum of 100 percent of poverty for those with 40 years of work. Further, the minimum is wage indexed starting in 2004 to prevent erosion of its value. Because general revenues finance this minimum benefit, it does not adversely affect the OASDI trust fund. However, general revenue is a scarce resource. Our simulations do not consider the trade-offs that Congress will face in terms of competing priorities for general revenue expenditures. The general-revenue financed minimum benefit is quite different from potential reforms to the SSI program, which would also be financed by general revenues. The Social Security minimum benefit is tied to Social Security covered work history and has no asset test. SSI, on the other hand, is based on current income, regardless of work history, and is limited to those with very low assets.
Option 3: OASDI benefit cut plus minimum benefit financed by additional OASDI benefit cuts. Option 3 includes the same OASDI benefit cut of option 1, and the same minimum benefit of option 2, but finances the minimum benefit through additional reductions to OASDI worker benefits rather than through general revenues. Specifically, we readjust the bend points in the PIA formula for each cohort, reducing them sufficiently to finance the minimum benefit (based on tabulations of the total expenditures on the minimum benefit by cohort). For example, in the 1944 cohort, we reduce each of the bend points by an additional 3.7 percent (above the scheduled one percent reduction), and for the 1954 cohort by an additional 3.5 percent (above the scheduled 11 percent reduction). By financing the minimum benefit through additional reductions to OASDI worker benefits, this option avoids the "free-rider" problem of many reform proposals in 3 In MINT, the reform could also influence retirement decisions via a reduction in Social Security wealth and influence Social Security take-up decisions through changes to the individual's and his/her spouse's PIA. We have elected against integrating such behavioral responses into our projections, given the modesty of their effects in sensitivity analyses that we conducted (available upon request). Like our sensitivity analyses, the literature on claiming responses to Social Security benefit cuts tends to find very modest responses, on the order of a few months for a benefit cut of seven to 20 percent (Fields and Mitchell 1984 , Burtless and Moffitt 1984 , Panis et al 2002 . Responses may be especially modest in the low-income population, as persons who are close to SSI eligibility tend to have limited human capital and work experience, rendering them unlikely to radically change work behavior. which the Social Security trust fund balance is improved at the expense of general revenues or future cohorts of workers.
Option 4: OASDI benefit cut plus increase SSI general income exclusion. Option 4 differs from the others in that it introduces a change to the SSI program rules to dampen the effect of reduced OASDI benefits on low-income elderly beneficiaries. As we have noted, the SSI gene ral income exclusion currently allows recipients to exclude the first $20 of monthly income from their SSI countable income, which for most elderly SSI recipients amounts to excluding $20 of their monthly Social Security benefit. By increasing the general income exclusion -in this case, to its level had it been price indexed since 1974 -low-income OASDI beneficiaries would be able to exclude a larger amount of their Social Security benefit, thus increasing their monthly SSI benefit. Because the Social Security minimum benefit in Options 2 and 3 is tied to work history, some low-income Social Security beneficiaries may not qualify for the minimum benefit. For those individuals, an expanded SSI program may be the only source of income support in the face of the Social Security benefit cuts. In addition, this reform would benefit those SSI recipients who are not Social Security beneficiaries to the extent that they have income in excess of the current $20 general income exclusion. It also may induce entry into the SSI program. The higher general income exclusion would expand the pool of SSI eligible individuals, and may be enough to entice some eligible nonparticipants to take up SSI benefits.
Option 5: OASDI benefit cut plus increase SSI federal benefit rate. The increase in the SSI general income exclusion is targeted in the sense that it benefits primarily those elderly SSI recipients with Social Security income. Option 5 includes a more general reform to the SSI program -increasing the federal bene fit rate by 13 percent, to be phased in in the same manner as the OASDI benefit cut of option 1. This across-the-board increase will benefit all elderly SSI recipients in the affected cohorts, whether or not they face reduced OASDI benefits, as well as expand the eligibility pool and induce entry into the SSI program. Thus, we expect its effects to be greater than the effects of option 4, but somewhat less target efficient to the extent that SSIonly recipients will also see an increase in their monthly income. Nevertheless, even with a 13 percent increase in the federal benefit rate, the SSI income guarantee still falls below poverty (about 83 percent of the federal poverty guideline for and individual and 93 percent for a couple).
Option 6: OASDI benefit cut plus increase SSI asset thresholds. Previous research has shown that the SSI asset test is particularly restrictive in terms of screening out potential elderly SSI recipients. Many elderly individuals have incomes low enough to pass the SSI income test, but are ineligible because their countable assets exceed the asset threshold. SSI reforms that increase the asset threshold are more beneficial to the lowest-income elderly individuals than are cost-equivalent increases in the federal benefit rate or the general income exclusion (Rupp, Strand, and Davies, 2003; Davies, Rupp, and Strand, forthcoming) . Option 6 simulates an increase in the asset threshold to $20,000 for individuals and $30,000 for couples in 2003 (and price indexes the thresholds thereafter), in conjunction with the 13 percent reduction in OASDI benefits. For elderly individuals who currently receive SSI benefits, this option would have no effect on SSI benefits and will not offset the OASDI benefit reduction. For SSI income-eligible individuals who have resources in excess of the current SSI asset threshold, this option can have potentially very strong effects in terms of offsetting the OASDI benefit cuts. For example, based on income alone, an individual may be eligible for the full federal benefit ($552 in 2003) , but may receive nothing if her countable assets are greater than $2,000. When the asset threshold is increased, that same individual faces a $552 monthly incentive to take up SSI benefits. Options 4 and 5, on the other hand, provide only marginal increases in potential SSI benefits for new eligibles and eligible nonparticipants.
Methods
To examine interactions between Social Security reform and SSI, we use the SSA's Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT3). MINT is a microsimulation model. Its starting database, comprised of the 1926 to 1965 birth cohorts, is drawn from the 1990 to 1993 panels of the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The model uses annual aging algorithms estimated from panel data, and provides extensive detail on retirement income sources, including earnings, wealth, pensions, Social Security, and SSI benefits. Appendix Table 1 provides general details about MINT. Specific details about individual modules are available in Appendix Table 2 . Microsimulation is an ideal method for examining the distributional effects of public pension and social assistance reform (Burtless 1996) .
The SSA has been developing MINT to project the economic needs of the baby boom cohorts in retirement, beginning with the work of Iams and Sandell (1997) . Subsequently, researchers from the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation, and the Urban Institute made substantial contributions to the model's development (see, for example, Toder et al. 1999 , Panis and Lillard 1999 . Researchers have used this model to examine a number of important questions, including projections of future poverty levels (Butrica, Smith, and Toder 2002) , effects of divorce on retirement well-being (Butrica and Iams 2000) , and effects of removal of the retirement earnings test before the normal retirement age (Berk, Favreault, and Ratcliffe 2003) . Work to model the plans of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security is underway as well (Butrica and Uccello, forthcoming).
For the current project, one key advantage of MINT over other microanalytic models is its match to administrative records on earnings and Social Security Administration program benefit receipts. In surveys, individuals often misreport their earnings (for example, rounding to the nearest multiple of $1,000 or $5,000). They also frequently misreport their reasons for receipt of benefits from SSA programs (for example, they confuse the Supplemental Security Income program with the Social Security program) .
Recent analyses for the development of a new release of MINT, MINT4, suggest that the MINT3 results are sensitive to economic conditions in the last year for which the model uses administrative data. Because MINT3's last year of administrative data is 1999, a boom year for the U.S. economy, the projections are fairly optimistic. They show substantial declines in aged poverty by 2022, though some groups remain quite vulnerable. Because of this sensitivity to economic cycles, we suggest that readers interpret our projection results conservatively, bearing in mind the considerable uncertainty that always surrounds long-term projections of this type.
SSI Participation
For the estimates presented in this paper, we have developed a model of SSI participation among the elderly, which uses the SSI Financial Eligibility Model as its base. These new SSI participation parameters replace the original MINT3 SSI participation parameters and are used within the existing MINT module to project SSI participation and benefits into the future. The SSI Financial Eligibility Model (FEM) is a microsimulation model that the Social Security Administration's Office of Policy developed to estimate SSI financial eligibility and participation, and to simulate the effects of potential SSI policy changes. For example, SSA analysts have used the FEM to simulate the effects of cost-equivalent increases of the federal benefit rate, the general income exclusion, and the asset threshold on the poverty gap among the elderly (Davies, Rupp, and Strand forthcoming) . The FEM also has been used to simulate the effect on poverty among elderly women of cost-equivalent Social Security-related SSI reforms, including creating a Social Security income exclusion, and replacing the SSI asset test with an income debit based on the annuitized value of countable assets (Rupp, Strand, and Davies 2003) . The FEM uses data from the SIPP, matched to SSA administrative data on SSI recipients, to estimate SSI eligibility and the expected federal SSI benefit. Currently, the FEM is capable of producing estimates for 1991 (using the 1990 SIPP) and 1997 (using the 1996 SIPP). A detailed discussion of the data and methodology used in the FEM is provided in Davies et al (2002) .
We combine the 1991 and 1997 data and estimate a model of SSI participation among SSI eligible individuals aged 65 and over. Based on the FEM, the individuals in our sample are categorically eligible for SSI (aged 65 or older), pass the SSI resource test (countable assets less than $2,000 for individuals and $3,000 for couples), and pass the SSI income test (countable income less than the federal benefit rate for individuals/couples of $407/$610 in 1991 and $484/$726 in 1997). The estimation sample includes 548 individuals in 1991 and 842 individuals in 1997, for a combined sample of 1,390 individuals. We present descriptive characteristics of these individuals in Appendix Table 3 .
We estimated the probability of SSI participation using the standard probit model. Participation is a function of a vector of exogenous variables that are projected for each future year in the MINT model, including the expected federal SSI benefit (in 1997 dollars), potential SSI state supplements, the number of months of SSI receipt since age 62, an indicator of shared living arrangements, and standard demographic characteristics. We present the probit coefficients and ma rginal effects in Appendix Table 4 .
Perhaps the most important independent variable is the expected federal SSI benefit. Numerous studies in the long line of literature on SSI participation among the elderly have found a positive and statistically significant relationship between expected benefits and SSI participation. For example, Coe (1985) found that a $10 increase in the expected SSI benefit would increase the probability of participation among eligible individuals aged 65 and older by 2.4 percentage points. McGarry (1996) estimated a very comparable effect of 2.6 percentage points for the same population. Focusing on eligible individuals aged 70 and older, Davies (2002) and McGarry (2002) estimated that a $10 increase in the predicted SSI benefit would increase the probability of SSI participation by 1.5 percentage points and 0.7 percentage points, respectively. Our estimates using combined 1991 and 1997 SIPP data on elderly SSI eligibles suggest that the expected SSI benefit is positively and significantly related to SSI participation. A $10 increase in the federal SSI benefit would increase the probability of participation by 0.3 percentage points among eligible individuals aged 65 and older. This estimate compares favorably with previous estimates using 1991 data from the SSI FEM Rupp, Strand, and Davies 2003) .
Another key variable in our model is the number of months of SSI receipt since age 62. Prior association with the SSI program is positively related to current SSI participation, with an additional month of prior participation increasing the probability of current period participation by approximately one percentage point.
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Age is negatively and significantly related to the probability of SSI participation among elderly eligible individuals. Females are significantly less likely to participate than males, all else equal. Blacks, Native Americans, Asians, and Hispanics are less likely to participate than non-Hispanic whites, although the coefficients are not statis tically significant. Elderly SSI eligible individuals who are widowed or never married are significantly more likely than those who are married to participate in the SSI program. Being divorced or separated also is positively related to SSI participation, although the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. Elderly SSI eligible individuals who own their home are significantly less likely to participate than those who do not own their home (i.e., rent or live in another person's home). Shared living arrangements (defined as living with at least one relative other than a spouse who is aged 30 or older) are positively and significantly related to SSI participation. Elderly SSI eligible individuals with shared living arrangements are 8.3 percentage points more likely to participate in the SSI program than those who live independently.
Receipt of Social Security income by the individual or his/her spouse increases the probability of SSI participation 11.1 percentage points relative to those without Social Security income. The estimated coefficient on self-reported fair or poor health is positive, but not statistically significant. Foreign-born individuals are more likely to participate in the program, but again the effect is not statistically significant. However, the number of years since migration to the U.S. is a significant determinant of SSI participation. The probability of SSI participation among eligible elderly individuals increases with years since migration at a decreasing rate. This may reflect recent reforms to SSI that require U.S. citizenship or 40 quarters of Social Securitycovered employment for most immigrants who entered the U.S. after August 1996.
Results

Current law estimates for 2022 -Social Security and SSI
Under current law, MINT projects important changes to Social Security benefits through 2022. For example, women increasingly receive OASDI benefits in their own right, rather than as spouses or survivors. At ages 65 to 78, nearly 58 percent of female bene ficiaries are entitled to Social Security solely as workers, and close to 95 percent are entitled as workers or dual entitlees (Table 2) . 6 They still receive average family benefits that are lower than men's, though, $19,134 annually (in 2002 dollars) for women ages 65 to 78, compared to $21,136 for men in this same age range. (These averages are for the entire population, and thus are not conditional upon OASDI benefit receipt. When we restrict the calculation to beneficiaries, these averages increase to $23,326 for men and $20,456 for women.) MINT projects marked declines over the next two decades in the percentage of elderly individuals who receive SSI. While at present about 5.2 percent of the population age 65 and older receives an SSI check (Social Security Administration 2003a), by 2022 less than 4 percent of the population age 65 and older should be receiving SSI benefits.
7 Among the population affected by our simulations (those ages 65 to 78), just under 3 percent receive SSI benefits. This projected downward trend is not surprising, given that SSI benefits are indexed to prices, while initial Social Security benefits are indexed to wages and many of SSI's eligibility and exclusion parameters are not indexed. This implies that Social Security benefits should grow faster than SSI benefits and, because of one-for-one replacement of SSI benefits by unearned income (including Social Security), should increasingly supplant them. Further, increased work by women and broader Social Security coverage of the labor force mean that fewer people will reach retirement without a work history or with significant fractions of their work history in employment that Social Security did not cover.
General results of reform options in 2022
Tables 3 through 7 provide a summary of key results from the simulations of the reform options, including estimates of total costs, poverty impacts, and gains and losses, in turn. For these tables, we restrict the population to persons that the reforms could potentially affect, those ages 65 to 78 in 2022. We report all benefit amounts in constant 2002 dollars.
Readers seeking additional detail can consult additional tables in the appendix. More detailed poverty estimates are in Appendix Table 5 . More detailed results for winners, losers, and aggregate benefit distributions from each of the six simulations are available in Appendix Tables 6 though 11. These tables include comparisons of OASDI, SSI, and combined benefits by sex, marital status, age, shared lifetime earnings quintile, 8 health status, and various combinations of these attributes.
Costs
Five of the six options that we simulate are relatively close in terms of how they change combined SSI and Social Security expenditures. Table 3 presents SSI and OASDI program costs (in 2002 dollars) in 2022, our analysis year. It reveals that the benefit cut alone, the benefit cut with the expenditure-neutral minimum benefit, the increase in the SSI general income exclusion, the 13 percent SSI increase, and the increase in the SSI asset threshold all reduce combined OASDI/SSI expenditures to between 92.6 percent and 92.7 percent of promised current law levels in 2022. The reform with the general revenue-financed minimum has the smallest effect on the deficit of the six; under it, projected 2022 expenditures are 94.9 percent of what current law promises.
These combined figures mask important variation in expenditure changes for the two programs across the different options. A first important point is that when we impose the 13 percent cut in Social Security benefits, the overall cost reduction is far less than 13 percent. This is because we phase in the cuts gradually (as Table 1 notes, by one percentage point per year per cohort, starting with the 1944 cohort). By 2022, the cut in Social Security benefits relative to current law promised benefits totals about 7.3 percent. In the three simulations with SSI changes, we assume the Social Security benefit cut to be identical. With the cut-financed minimum benefit, the Social Security cost reduction in 2022 is slightly more than for the 13 percent cut alone, coming in at about 7.4 percent of current law expenditures.
9 With the general revenue-financed minimum benefit in OASDI, however, the Social Security cost reduction is sub stantially smaller in 2022, only about 5.1 percent less than current law.
A modest increase in SSI expenditures, of about 5.4 percent of current law levels, accompanies the 13 percent OASDI cut when there are no additional changes to Social Security or SSI. Even after the 13 percent OASDI benefit cut, the SSI increase does not approach the scope of the OASDI cut because such a small fraction of the aged population is eligible for SSI and the SSI take-up rates are low.
The options with the OASDI and SSI parameter changes designed to offset the OASDI benefit cut for low-income beneficiaries have varying impacts on SSI expenditures. For example, under the reform that couples the 13 percent OASDI benefit cut with a liberalized SSI asset threshold, SSI expenditures increase by 54 percent over current law levels in 2022. The 13 percent SSI benefit increase leads to the next largest increase in SSI expenditures (of about 16.5 percent), followed by the increase in the general income exclusion (at about 16 percent). Under the former reform, an increase of larger than 13 percent is possible because increased benefits lead to greater eligibility and take-up than is present at baseline. The two minimum benefit plans, in contrast, actually reduce SSI expenditures. As the more generous OASDI benefits become available to concurrent OASDI-SSI beneficiaries, SSI expenditures fall by 1.7 percent under the general-revenue financed version and 1.0 percent under the less generous cut-financed plan, relative to current law expenditures.
Program Interaction
The aggregate cost figures mask how the two programs overlap for individual beneficiaries. Table 4 provides a clearer picture of program interactions for the older population in 2022.
10 Under current law, 92.7 percent of individuals ages 65 to 78 in 2022 receive Social Security but do not receive SSI. Four and one-half percent of persons in this age range do not receive benefits from either program.
11 The final two groups -those who receive both SSI and Social Security and those who receive SSI but not Social Security -are very similar in size under current law, at just under one and one-half percent each.
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Under the six reforms, the changes from the baseline status are relatively modest. The percentage with concurrent SSI-OASDI benefits increases with the benefit cut alone and the benefit cut coupled with SSI reforms (the GIE increase, 13 percent federal benefit increase, and asset threshold increase), but declines with the introduction of the two minimum benefits. Consistent with the cost estimates, the fractions moving onto the SSI program are most substantial in the final reform, in which we increase and then index the SSI asset threshold. The percentage receiving both Social Security and SSI nearly doubles to 2.6 percent of persons aged 65 to 78, and the percentage receiving SSI only increases to 2.2 percent. For the GIE increase and 13 percent SSI increase, concurrent beneficiaries receive virtually all of the increase (from the Social Security and no SSI group, which declines).
Poverty and near poverty
To consider how the six reforms impact absolute economic well-being of older Americans in 2022, we use three separate measures of poverty (Table 5 ). The first is whether one's Social Security benefit alone exceeds the federal poverty threshold. A second measure compares total family income to 125 percent of poverty. 13 We refer to persons with family incomes that fall below that level as "in or near poverty." The final measure is the traditional measure of whether total family income is less than the poverty threshold. 10 In this table we define program interactions on a couple basis for married persons (i.e., if one spouse receives Social Security benefits, then we classify both as beneficiaries). 11 This population consists of three types of people: 1) the relatively rare persons who do not collect their Social Security benefits until significantly later than first eligibility for benefits (and, in some cases, even until after the normal retirement age, which ranges from 66 to 66 and 6 months for members of these cohorts); 2) those who do not qualify for benefits from either program (for example, a person with limited covered work history but high assets or a large government pension that disqualifies him or her from SSI); and 3) those who qualify for SSI benefits but choose not to take them up. 12 The close balance between SSI beneficiaries with and without OASDI represents somewhat of a shift from current experience, where a majority (58.4 percent) of SSI beneficiaries have Social Security income (Social Security Administration 2002: 289). 13 We define total family income as the sum of income from earnings, assets, pensions (including defined benefit pensions, defined contribution pensions, IRAs and Keogh accounts), Social Security, and SSI for individuals and, where applicable, their spouses and coresident family members.
By design, the general-revenue financed minimum benefit reduces poverty relative to the current law baseline, while costing significantly less than current law promised benefits. For example, the current law poverty rate of 4.0 percent for persons ages 65 to 78 increases to 4.8 percent with the OASDI benefit cut, but is reduced to 3.9 percent with the cut and the general revenue financed minimum benefit. With the cut-financed minimum, poverty stays at its prebenefit cut level of 4.0 percent. This suggests that a reduced Social Security program could do as well (if not better) at poverty alleviation than current law. But, as we will describe below, this poverty reduction comes at a cost of reduced benefits among those workers and their spouses/survivors who are entitled to higher Social Security benefits before the reform.
Across beneficiary groups, the 2022 poverty estimates vary greatly. Individuals ages 65 to 78 who are collecting Social Security and not SSI have very low poverty rates, 1.6 percent under current law and 2.5 percent under the OASDI benefit reduction. All other groups show much more substantial levels of risk. Just over a quarter (27.6 percent) of the non-beneficiaries (those collecting neither SSI nor OASDI) are projected to be in poverty, with or without the OASDI benefit cut. By definition, SSI recipients are poor or near poor. Concurrent recipients (those collecting both OASDI and SSI benefits) have a poverty rate that approaches half (48.3 percent) under both current law and with the 13 percent Social Security cut. Those with just SSI are the most vulnerable of all. More than half (51.8 percent) are in poverty (again, independent of the Social Security cut).
High poverty rates for aged SSI beneficiaries persist across the reforms that aim to mitigate the effects of the benefit cuts. The 13 percent SSI benefit increase and the general income exclusion increase do the most to reduce poverty rates among elderly concurrent OASDI-SSI beneficiaries, decreasing them by about 4.5 percentage points to 43.7 percent and 43.6 percent, respectively, from 48.3 percent with the benefit cut alone. Although Table 6 indicates that poverty rates are unchanged for concurrent beneficiaries under the option that increases the SSI asset threshold, this is largely an artifact of the changing composition of concurrent OASDI-SSI recipients under the reform. Many current law non-recipients with very high poverty rates become SSI recipients when the SSI asset threshold is expanded and thus depress the poverty rate of SSI recipients under the reform. The non-beneficiary poverty levels decline to 24.5 percent (from 27.6 percent under current law) with the liberalization of the SSI asset threshold. Moreover, the poverty rate for all individuals aged 65 to 78 in 2022 decreases from 4.8 percent with the OASDI benefit cut to 4.6 percent with the OASDI benefit cut combined with increasing the SSI asset threshold. These modest overall results are not all that surprising, given that SSI does not guarantee a poverty level income and given that the Social Security minimum benefit only grants a poverty level benefit to persons with very long work histories (most of whom already had benefits above poverty). Table 6 shows patterns of gains and losses for people ages 65 to 78 in 2022, comparing benefits promised under current law to the alternatives. It first presents statistics for all persons, and then isolates Social Security and SSI beneficiaries in particular. The table presents conditional means for the amount of gains and losses; that is, the means are calculated only for those who gain or lose, respectively. Under the simple benefit cut option and all of the options that cut benefits in tandem with SSI increases, almost 93 percent of all persons and 98 percent of Social Security beneficiaries lose Social Security benefits.
Gains and losses from reform
14 Under the minimum benefit reforms, fewer Social Security beneficiaries lose benefits, but still over four out of five have lower benefits in each case (82.2 and 84.0 percent for the general revenue and cut-financed minimums, respectively). The sizes of the average OASDI benefit losses are fairly similar across reforms, again with the exception of the two minimum benefit plans. While the general revenue-financed minimum benefit plan reduces losses for OASDI beneficiaries (from an average of $1,780 to $1,720), the cut-financed minimum benefit plan increases them (to $2,310). This occurs because the population of beneficiaries who lose (over whom the statistic is defined) has become more select. Those low-income persons who qualify for the minimum are no longer included in the statistic, and they had reduced the average loss somewhat.
As suggested in the earlier tables, SSI gainers are just a small fraction of the persons who experience a Social Security benefit cut. Only 2.4 percent of OASDI beneficiaries receive an offset from SSI when Social Security benefits are cut by 13 percent.
15 When we isolate the near poverty population, 15.5 percent of the population receives increased SSI benefits under the option that cuts benefits alone. This extends to well over one-fifth (21.9 percent) for the simulation with the general income exclusion increase, nearly three in ten (29.8 percent) for the 13 percent SSI benefit increase, and 28.8 percent with the increase in (and indexing of) the SSI asset threshold. Looking at the even more select group of SSI beneficiaries, fully 26 percent benefit from an SSI offset to the decrease in Social Security benefits. Well over a third (37 percent) benefit from the indexation of the general income exclusion, and of course all benefit from the 13 percent benefits increase.
The amounts of average SSI benefit gains vary substantially across the reforms. Average annual gains are by far the largest with the increase in (and indexing of) the SSI asset threshold, amounting to $3,132 for all persons with a gain, $2,042 for Social Security beneficiaries with a gain, $2,746 for persons with income in or near poverty who gain, and $3,438 for SSI recipients with a gain. As discussed previously, although the poverty rate was not substantially changed under this reform, the income of affected individuals increased substantially. SSI increases also are fairly substantial for persons under the general income exclusion increase, averaging $1,050 for all who gain, $960 for Social Security beneficiaries who gain, $1,040 for gainers with total family income less than the poverty threshold, and $780 for SSI beneficiaries (some of whom are new entrants to the program). A much smaller percentage of OASDI beneficiaries see a much 14 The 2.0 percent of beneficiaries who do not lose benefits are mainly persons receiving a benefit on the record of a deceased spouse who is older, and thus had grandfathered benefits under the reform. 15 As noted, MINT projections are fairly optimistic because the last data year was one of strong economic performance. Even if our SSI projections are somewhat rosy, the point that SSI will make only a modest difference to Social Security beneficiaries in the wake of large cuts to the Social Security program is still supported. For example, even if SSI were to double in scope from this MINT projection, it would still reach less than 5 percent of Social Security beneficiaries under the 13 percent benefit cut option and offset cost savings by less than 0.3 percent of combined OASDI/SSI costs in 2022. So even if the quantitative estimates from MINT understate the effect, the qualitative finding that OASDI reform does not shift a large fraction of costs to the SSI program is likely to stand.
smaller SSI increase for the minimum benefit options, averaging $540 annually for the generalrevenue financed minimum and $690 for the cut-financed minimum.
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Although the combined OASDI and SSI benefit losses are greater than the OASDI benefit losses alone, the percentage losing (which is the base of the statistic) is much smaller for the former. For example, under the asset threshold reform, the combined benefit loss is $1,784 for Social Security beneficiaries, but the Social Security only loss is $1,783. However, only 95.6 percent are combined OASDI/SSI benefit losers, compared to 98.0 percent Social Security only losers. This implies that the SSI reform has a substantial effect in terms of mitigating Social Security benefit reductions. Having said that, the fact remains that fractions losing are much smaller under the two minimum benefit options.
Equity
In addition to the adequacy concerns, equity issues arise under these reforms. Table 7 presents combined Social Security and SSI benefit losses across the six reforms by the number of years that a person has spent in Social Security covered employment. Perhaps most notable in the table is the reduction in the fraction of persons with a high number of work years who lose when benefit cuts are combined with the two mitigating minimum benefit proposals. With the 13 percent benefit cut alone, virtually all people with 20 to 29, 30 to 34, or 35 and more years in the labor force lose benefits (97.1, 98.6, and 98.1 percent, respectively). These figures drop under the general-revenue financed minimum by as much as 20 percentage points for those with work histories of 20 to 29 years and 30 to 34 years (to 76.6 and 77.7 percent, respectively). Those with 35 work years or more see a decline of more than ten percentage points (to 87.5 percent). Patterns are similar, though with slightly higher fractions of losers, under the cutfinanced minimum. The SSI reforms, in contrast, do little to change patterns of gains and losses by work history.
Conclusions
The current SSI program will shield only a fraction of elderly individuals from cuts to their Social Security benefits required to bring the system into long-term fiscal balance. Social Security benefits will supplant SSI benefits in the future as Social Security benefits rise with real wages and SSI parameters fail to keep pace with inflation. In simulatio ns in which the SSI general income exclusion is increased to its inflation-adjusted level, the percentage of elderly individuals who receive SSI increased, the percentage of elderly individuals who receive larger SSI benefits increased, and the average benefit gain increased. Corresponding effects for the simulation that increased SSI federal benefit rate simulation were somewhat stronger. The option that increased the SSI asset threshold produced the strongest results among the SSI options considered, consistent with previous research. Although poverty rates among the elderly were not substantially reduced, the income of concurrent Social Security-SSI recipients and SSIonly recipients increased markedly relative to the Social Security benefit cut reform. The reform options that included a Social Security minimum benefit, however, produced the strongest results across the board.
This study raises the question of whether it is preferable to meet the needs of the lowincome elderly through the Social Security program or through a means-tested social welfare program like SSI. Social Security minimum benefits as specified in our analyses are clearly more effective at reducing poverty among the elderly than the SSI reform options and are better targeted if the goal is to offset lost income due to Social Security benefit cuts. As demonstrated, minimum benefits could be designed in a cost neutral way. This would make the program more redistributive than it is under current law.
Nevertheless, SSI plays a vital income security role for many low-income elderly individuals. Thus, SSI reform is of course another option for protecting this population. The study has revealed that changes to the SSI asset threshold could substantially broaden the program's scope and make inroads toward poverty reduction among the elderly in the wake of OASDI cuts. SSI benefit increases and an increase in the general income exclusion make smaller differences, but could nonetheless benefit some Social Security beneficiaries at the lower end of the income distribution.
In the final analysis, it may be the case that some combination of Social Security minimum benefits and SSI reform would be desirable to protect lower income beneficiaries from across-the-board benefit cuts. The highly stylized minimum benefits options in this paper are tied to work history. At least 15 years of covered work history are required before the minimum benefit provisions become effective. This leaves open the possibility that the most vulnerable Social Security beneficiaries -those with the lowest incomes and the shortest work histories, spouses, and survivors -will fall through the cracks. For those individuals, the SSI program, whether reformed or in its current state, will remain a critically important source of support. However, under a longer time horizon than that used in our MINT-based simulations, we would expect SSI's reach among the elderly to continue to decline in the absence of reform.
Appendix -Sensitivity Analysis
The SSI participation model that we use in MINT includes the number of months of SSI receipt after age 62 as an exogenous explanatory variable. For projections of future SSI participation, this variable is useful in that it increases predictability and smoothes participation patterns over time. However, the assumption of exogeneity is questionable. Moreover, for simulations of SSI policy changes or Social Security reforms that might induce SSI participation among the elderly, this variable might be problematic. To test the sensitivity of our estimates to this specification, we re-estimated the SSI participation model without the SSI history variable. We present the estimated coefficients and marginal effects of the alternative specification in Appendix Table 12 . We then re-ran the current law simulation and the simulations for the six reform options using these alternative coefficients. Appendix Table 13 presents the results for Social Security and SSI benefit receipt and program cost among the elderly in 2022. The complete set of simulation results, including poverty estimates and winners and losers, is available from the authors.
The coefficients from the alternative specification of the SSI participation model (Appendix Table 12 ) differ somewhat from those in the original specification (Appendix Table  4 ). The key variable -the expected federal SSI benefit -remains positive and significant, and the marginal effect is stronger. The maximum potential state SSI supplement has a positive and significant effect in the alternative specification, whereas its effect was negative and not significant in the original specification. Three other notable changes are as follows: the coefficient on the age variable is positive (but not significant) in the alternative specification, whereas it is negative and significant in the original specification; the coefficient on the Hispanic indicator is positive and significant in the alternative specification, compared to negative and not significant in the original specification; and, the indicator of less than a high school education is positive and significant in the alternative specification, whereas it is negative and not significant in the original specification. Generally speaking, the changes are improvements. A number of other coefficients changed as well, but were either not significant or did not change sign.
The simulation results based on the alternative specification with respect to Social Security and SSI benefit receipt and program cost (Appendix Table 13 ) also differ in important ways from the results based on the original specification (Tables 3 and 4) . Most notably, the increase in SSI expenditures in wake of the 13 percent benefit cut is more substantial under this option, amounting to a 5.8 percent increase over current law expenditures (compared with a 5.4 percent increase based on the original specification of the SSI participation model).
Correspondingly, increases in SSI receipt in response to the Social Security benefit cuts are larger with the alternative specification. For example, using our original specification, the fraction of persons ages 65 to 78 in 2022 receiving both SSI and Social Security increased from 1.39 percent under current law to 1.81 percent with the 13 percent reduction in Social Security benefits, for a difference of 0.42 percentage points. With the alternative specification of SSI take-up, the fraction increases from 1.48 percent under current law to 1.95 percent with the reduction, for a difference of 0.47 percentage points. This is a far more substantial change.
Once again, these differences suggest the importance of conservative interpretation of our results. However, the overall qualitative picture remains fairly similar regardless of specification of the SSI participation model.
